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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Leroy Simpson appeals contending the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress the coerced-compliant statement 1 he made to officers after they
misused several interrogation tactics to overbear his will.

He also asserts that the

district court erred in several aspects of its analysis. First, it expressly did not consider
two relevant factors (whether Mr. Simpson had been informed of his rights under
Miranda 2 and whether Mr. Simpson's mental health issues impacted the involuntariness

of his statements). Second, the district court's conclusion that, in the totality of all the
relevant circumstances, Mr. Simpson's will was not overborn, is disproved by the
record. The video and transcript of the interrogation at issue both show how officers
successfully overbore Mr. Simpson's will by improperly employing various interrogation
tactics, and so, extracted a coerced-compliant statement from him.
As such, Mr. Simpson's statements from that interrogation should have been
suppressed as they were obtained in a violation of Mr. Simpson's constitutional rights.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying the motion to
suppress those statements and remand this case for further proceedings.

Dr. Charles Honts, who gave expert testimony about the psychology of interrogations
in this case, explained that the term "coerced-compliant confession" (or statement) is a
term of art used in the literature when the officers overbear the will of the subject of an
interrogation and extract a statement from the subject. (Tr., Vol.1, p.139, L.21 - p.140,
L.15.) That term is preferable because it helps avoid confusion resulting from
the different ways the more commonly-used term "false confession" might be
understood - false as to the facts of the statement, as opposed to false in that the
statement was involuntary. (Tr., Vol.1, p.139, L.21 -p.140, L.15.)
The references in these citations, as well as other citations in this brief, to "Vol.1"
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing held on
April 16, 2014. "Vol.2" refers to the volume containing the transcripts of the change of
plea hearing held on May 8, 2014, and the sentencing hearing held on October 2, 2014.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436, 458 (1966).
1

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
childhood While

Simpson experienced a
relatively well, he still required special
school.

was able to function

ucation classes in order to graduate high

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.11.)

Dr. Kenneth

Lindsey's initial evaluation of Mr. Simpson led him to believe, with ··some reasonable
confidence," Mr. Simpson was suffering from executive dysfunction

(Tr., Vol.1, p.89,

Ls.4-20.) Dr. Lindsey had also diagnosed Mr. Simpson with bipolar disorder, attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and a mixed learning disability, and had made a rule out
diagnosis for paraphilia.

(2013 Psychosexual Examination (hereinafter, PSE), p.12.)

He would subsequently perform a full evaluation, in which he diagnosed Mr. Simpson
with frontal lobe and executive function deficits, dysphasia, bipolar disorder, mixed
anxiety disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and mixed learning disability.
(2014 PSE, pp.7-8, 18.) 3
As

Dr.

Lindsey

explained,

these

conditions,

particularly

the

executive

dysfunction, make it difficult for Mr. Simpson to appreciate his decisions in their broader
context; he "just doesn't process information very quickly, and the thought processes
move slowly compared to the average person." 4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.10-12 (Dr. Lindsey
testifying about his conclusions regarding Mr. Simpson's mental health issues).) Thus,
Dr. Lindsey attributed Mr. Simpson's "simplistic and almost illogical" statements during
the interrogation to Mr. Simpson's mental health issues.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, L.4 - p.90,

L.14; cf 2014 PSE, pp.7-8 (describing it as the result of Mr. Simpson's "concrete
thought processes and generalized Executive Dysfunction").)

The 2014 evaluation incorporated most of the information from the 2013 PSE because
Mr. Simpson's stance on the underlying offense was unchanged. (2014 PSE, p.2.)

3

2

In addition to these mental health issues, Mr. Simpson's family life was traumatic.
PSI, p.9 (detailing that history,

included physical abuse

hands of his

the loss of his sister at a young age, and a struggle with drug abuse).) Those
issues ultimately resulted in Mr. Simpson being placed in foster care by Jessica Marley,
the social worker assigned to Mr. Simpson's case. (See Exhibit 1b, p.18, Ls.14-17.) 5
Mr. Simpson ultimately moved in with a friend, his friend's wife, and their two
sons (one grown, the other, a child).

Thereafter, the child, M.G., was taken to the

hospital and showed numerous injuries. Now-Officer Jessica Marley and Officer Brent
Lawrence were the primary investigators on that case.

They suspected that several

people, including Mr. Simpson had been involved in causing M G.'s injuries, but they did
not suspect that Mr. Simpson had caused all the injures. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.64,
Ls.18-20 (Officer Marley testifying, "I certainly probably did say that it wasn't his fault
Not all of it -- not all of it was his fault."); R., p.31 (Officer Marley's report indicating she
told M.G.'s mother that, if Officer Marley were the lead officer, M.G.'s mother would be
facing criminal charges in regard to this incident); see also Tr., Vol.2, p.37, Ls.3-7 (the
prosecutor admitting "I don't think the defendant caused all of the victim's injuries.
I mean, I don't want to stand here and say he's to blame for all of this because I don't
think that's the case.").)

The prosecutor offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Lindsey's testimony about the
nature and presentation of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. (See generally R., Tr.)
5 The transcript of the police interrogation of Mr. Simpson was admitted as Exhibit 1b.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.6, Ls.12-13.) The corresponding video of that interrogation was admitted
as Exhibit 1a. (Tr., Vol.1, p.6, Ls.11-12.) Unfortunately, the audio on Exhibit 1a cuts in
and out throughout the recording. (See generally Exhibit 1a.) Thus, there are several
points where statements are inaudible. (See generally Exhibit 1b.) The time stamp on
Exhibit 1a shows the interview lasted from 11 :37:31 through 1:35:57, and citations to
that exhibit will include the relevant time stamp to the best of appellate counsel's ability.
4

3

Eventually, Officer Marley was asked to locate Mr. Simpson and bring him in for
an interview, which she

, Vol. 1, p.1

to be right then, and she indicated

Ls.13-19.) He asked her if the interview
, Vol.1, p.44,

that was preferable.

Ls.21-22.) She also told him he would not be arrested at that time. (Tr., Vol.1, p.45,
Ls.20-23.) As such, he changed clothes and Officer Marley drove him to the police
station. (Tr., Vol.1, p.45, Ls.2-5.)
When Mr. Simpson entered the interview room, he sat down in one of the two
chairs in the room. (Exhibit 1a, approx. 11 :47:45.) Officers immediately directed him to
sit in the other chair, which was against the wall opposite the door.

(Exhibit 1a,

approx. 11 :47:45.) When the officers entered, they would take the chair by the door,
and when both were in the room together, Officer Lawrence would stand either in front
of the door or in the door jam. (See generally Exhibit 1a.)
Officer Lawrence started the interrogation and reiterated that Mr. Simpson was
not under arrest and would be free to leave.

(Exhibit 1b, p.3, Ls.3-5.)

He did not

provide Mr. Simpson with a Miranda warning though. (R., p.116; see generally Exhibit
1b.)

After asking Mr. Simpson to clarify some facts, Officer Lawrence left and was

replaced by Officer Marley.

(Exhibit 1b, p.17, Ls.7-12.)

Officer Marley confronted

Mr. Simpson, asserting he was telling different versions of events.

(Exhibit 1b, p.17,

Ls.12-16.) She proceeded to interrogate Mr. Simpson on numerous issues related to
the investigation.

(See generally 1b.)

While most of the interrogation focused on

alleged incidents of physical abuse, Officer Marley briefly questioned Mr. Simpson on
injuries M.G. allegedly had to his anus, suggesting that M.G. had been sexually abused
as well. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.6-8.)

4

As Officer Marley interrogated Mr. Simpson, she began to develop several
forensic evidence they had gathered, and

example, she talked about

they now had "all the evidence we need" and so, he should just tell them what
happened. 6

(See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.30, L.19 - p.31, L.20.)

She also minimized

Mr. Simpson's alleged actions, indicating they were understandable because he must
have been exhausted or because of his own troubled childhood. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b,
p.20, Ls.7-9; Exhibit 1b, p.24, Ls.1-4; Exhibit 1b, p.35, Ls.2-8.)
Specifically in regard to her discussions of Mr. Simpson's troubled childhood,
Officer Marley reminded Mr. Simpson that she had been the social worker on the case,
and so, told him she just wanted to help him. 7 (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.18, Ls.12-18;
Exhibit 1b, p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.15; Exhibit 1b, p.32, Ls. 8-17; Exhibit 1b, p.37, Ls.15-18;
Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.15-21; Exhibit 1b, p.40, L.16 - p.41, L.21.)

Often, when she

switched to that theme, her demeanor and tone would change. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1a.
12:041:21-12:05:20; see generally Exhibit 1a.)
For most of Officer Marley's initial interrogation, Mr. Simpson denied hurting M.G.
(See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.24, Ls.23-24; Exhibit 1b, p.32, Ls.20-21; Exhibit 1b, p.36,

Ls.21-25; Exhibit 1b, p.38, L.8.) However, he also began to repeat back some of the
themes Officer Marley was developing. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.33, L.25 (adopting the

Both Officer Lawrence and Officer Marley admitted that they misrepresented the
nature and amount of forensic evidence to Mr. Simpson. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.32,
L.5 - p.33, L.7 (Officer Lawrence admitting he had not talked to the medical experts at
the time of the interrogation); Tr., Vol.1, p.73, L.17 - p.74, L.7 (Officer Marley admitting
she had not seen DNA results before bringing them up to Mr. Simpson).) In fact, they
were still awaiting test results on some of that evidence. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.35,
Ls.20-23.)
7 The district court found, as a matter of fact, that there was no patient-counselor
relationship between Mr. Simpson and Officer Marley, nor did she articulate the
specifics of their previous relationship experiences. (R., p.117 .)
6

5

theme that he was stressed out); Exhibit 1b, p.39, Ls.24-25 (adopting the theme that
is a hard

to talk about); Exhibit 1

p.42,

1

6 (adopting

theme that the

have other forensic evidence incriminating him).) Additionally, when he would
offer a denial or an alternate explanation to Officer Marley's assertions, she would reject
that as a lie. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.25, Ls.9-11; Exhibit 1b, p.31, Ls.19-20; Exhibit 1 b,
p.36, Ls.4-15; Exhibit 1b, p.42, Ls.8-9.)

At other times, Officer Marley would ask

Mr. Simpson, "how long are you going to live with this before it's going to affect you?"
(Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.17-18; see also Exhibit 1b, p.43, Ls.2-3.) When she was working
this theme, she would usually take up a different posture than when she was talking
about Mr. Simpson's childhood. (See generally Exhibit 1a.) For example, she would sit
back in her chair, often with arms or legs crossed, and she would use a different, less
friendly tone. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1a, 12:26:30-12:27:40; see generally Exhibit 1a.)
Ultimately, Officer Lawrence rejoined the interrogation.
shift aside so Officer Lawrence could enter the room.

Officer Marley had to

(Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:38:39.)

Officer Lawrence told Mr. Simpson that "[n]obody is going to believe you," explaining he
had talked with various physicians and experts who all had good reputations in the
community, and they would testify that Mr. Simpson was guilty. (Exhibit 1b, p.47, L.19;
Exhibit 1b, p.48, L. 19 - p.50, L.6.) He then asked Mr. Simpson: "So when you go to the
jury and all these doctors get up there and say this is what happened, who do you think
that the jury is going to be looking at?" at which point he bent over to peer into
Mr. Simpson's face. (Exhibit 1b, p.50, Ls.4-7; Exhibit 1a, 12:47:35.) When Mr. Simpson
responded, "[t]he person that did it," Officer Lawrence interrupted and said, "[t]hey're
going to be looking right at you, Le[r]oy." (Exhibit 1b, p.50, Ls.10-12.)

6

Officer Lawrence showed his frustration that Mr. Simpson was maintaining his
as his tone became more authoritative, and

told Mr. Simpson his words

were empty and untruthfuL (Exhibit 1b, p 50, Ls.12-23; Exhibit 1a, approx .. 12:46:30.)
He finally gave Mr. Simpson an ultimatum·
Which one do you want to be, the person that's being accused of this and
doesn't care or the person who cares and says, you know, I'm sorry, I tried
to take care of him .... This is your last chance, Le[r]oy. Do you want to
be the comparing -- or compassionate person who actually cares about
[M.G.] or this other person that people are like, I can't like that person. We
all understand bad things happen, but he doesn't even care. He says he
cares, but he doesn't because look at what we're here -- nothing to back it
up. He doesn't say what really happened.
(Exhibit 1b, p.51, L 12 - p.52, L.9.)
Despite that ultimatum, Mr. Simpson attempted to maintain his innocence, at
which point, Officer Lawrence yelled at him, "You did do it
opportunity to explain it, Le[r]oy."

I'm giving you the

(Exhibit 1b, p.52, Ls.17-24; Exhibit 1a, approx.

12:51 :10; see also R., p.88.) Things remained at that heated level until Officer Marley
intervened. (See Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:53:08; Exhibit 1b, p.52, L.24 - p.55, L.4.) She
told Mr. Simpson she understood his emotions because she knew his past, and she just
wanted to help him because "I'm a social worker wearing a police uniform." (Exhibit 1b,
p.57, Ls.5-6; see generally Exhibit 1b, p.56, L.4 - p.58, L.21.) At that point, Mr. Simpson
asked, "(Inaudible) cigarette first." (Exhibit 1b, p.58, L.22.) Officer Marley told him that
would be fine and accompanied him outside. (Exhibit 1b. p.58, Ls.23-25.) She did not
consider letting Mr. Simpson go unsupervised. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.16-18.)
When they came back inside, Mr. Simpson made several incriminating
statements to Officer Marley about hitting M.G.

(See generally Exhibit 1b, p.59,

L.1 - p.63, L.11.) Officer Marley's demeanor, posture, and tone remained friendly during
this portion of the interrogation. (See Exhibit 1a, 1:02:02 - 1:08:25.) She then began
7

asking questions about the injuries to M G 's anus, and Mr. Simpson continued to deny
12 - p.65, L 10.) Officer Marley told

causing those injuries. (See Exhibit 1b,

Simpson not to regress, and he eventually admitted to penetrating M.

with his

finger. (Exhibit 1b, p.65, Ls.2-16; Exhibit 1b, p.66, Ls.23-25.)
However, Officer Marley continued to interrogate Mr. Simpson, representing that
there were injuries more extensive than would be caused by just a finger. (Exhibit 1 b,
p.67, Ls.10-12.)

When Mr. Simpson mentioned that those injuries could have been

caused by a vibrator, Officer Marley asked if he specifically had used that to penetrate
M.G., saying "It's okay, Le[r]oy, if you did."

(Exhibit 1b, p.67, Ls.19-22.)

When

Mr. Simpson refused to adopt that suggestion, Officer Marley told him. 'Tm not trying to
say that you're bad. I just am trying to figure out the truth because you can't live with
this bottled up anymore. I'm trying to figure out and make sure that there are no other
children ... [b]ecause if that's the case, you need a different kind of help." (Exhibit 1 b,
p. 70, L.24 - p. 71, L.6; Exhibit 1a, 1: 19:37 - 1:20:02.) Mr. Simpson responded that there
were no other children and affirmed the suggestion that he had used the vibrator on
M.G. (Exhibit 1b, p.71, Ls.17-20.) The officers finished up the interview and offered to
drive Mr. Simpson home. (See generally Exhibits 1a, 1b.)
Mr. Simpson was subsequently charged with sexual penetration and injury
to a child.

(R., pp.9-10; see Augmentation.) 8

He filed a motion to suppress the

statements made during the interrogation as involuntary and the product of coercion.
(R., pp.84-90.)

In his motion, he highlighted several tactics employed during the

A motion to augment the record with the information filed against Mr. Simpson was
filed contemporaneously with this brief.

8

8

interrogation that were part of the so-called "Reid technique," and which demonstrated
impermissibly coercive atmosphere

. (R., pp.84-90.)

a hearing on his motion, Officers Lawrence and Marley testified about their
approaches to the interrogation. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.8-82.) Mr. Simpson also
called Dr. Honts, a professor of psychology, to discuss the problems with the way the
officers employed their interrogation tactics against Mr. Simpson.

(See generally

Tr., Vol.1, pp.93-142.) For example, Dr. Honts explained that Officer Marley's reliance
on her prior relationship with Mr. Simpson "seems very coercive psychologically, and I
was actually very surprised to see that someone would do that."
L.11

p.112, L.6.)

(Tr., Vol.1, p.111,

He also explained that every admission Mr. Simpson made was

initially suggested by one of the officers, including the use of the vibrator. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.112, L.24 - p.113, L.4.) Dr. Lindsey, who had performed a psychosexual evaluation
on Mr. Simpson, also testified that Mr. Simpson's reference to the vibrator in the first
place was illogical and demonstrative of an irregular thought process during the
interrogation, which was consistent with

Mr.

Simpson's mental health issues.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.11-24.)
The district court ultimately denied Mr. Simpson's motion to suppress.
(R., pp.111-18.) In so doing, it determined the fact that Mr. Simpson had not been read

his Miranda rights to be irrelevant because this was not a custodial interrogation;
Mr. Simpson was there voluntarily and free to leave. (R., p.116.) The district court also
accepted the officer's testimony that Mr. Simpson appeared to be tracking their
questions during the interrogation, and so determined that Mr. Simpson's mental health
issues did not factor in to the involuntariness of his statements.

(R., p.117.)

It

noted that all interrogation techniques are designed to be coercive, but determined that,
9

the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Simpson's statements were voluntary.
11
Simpson subsequently entered an Alforcf! plea pursuant
(R., pp.122-25.)

a plea agreement

As part of that plea, Mr. Simpson reserved the right to appeal the

district court's order denying his motion to suppress.

(R., p.122.)

The district court

ultimately imposed a unified sentence of thirty-three years, with eight years fixed, on the
then-thirty-one-year-old Mr. Simpson

(R., pp.140-41; PSI, p.1.)

timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.149-50.)

9

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
10

Mr. Simpson filed a

ISSUE
district court erred in denying Mr. Simpson's motion to suppress the
statement
officers extracted from
after overbearing his will

11

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Simpson's Motion To Suppress The CoercedCompliant Statement The Officers Extracted From Him After Overbearing His Will

A.

Standard Of Review
The standard for review for motions to suppress is bifurcated.

See, e.g.,

State v. Aitken, 121 Idaho 783, 784 (Ct App. 1992). The factual findings of the district
court will not be disturbed absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous.

Id.

However, the application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo. Id. In cases
where the defendant claims his statements to officers were not made voluntarily, the
burden of proof is on the State - the State must show, by a totality of the circumstances,
the statement was made voluntarily. Id.

B.

The Totality Of The Circumstances Shows That The Officers' Interrogation
Tactics Overbore Mr. Simpson's Will And Resulted In An Coerced-Compliant
Statement In Violation Of Mr. Simpson's Constitutional Rights
One of the constitutional rights citizens of the United States and of the State of

Idaho enjoy is the right to not be compelled to be a witness against themselves.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.

Thus, when the defendant

makes statements as the product of either express or implicit police coercion, those
statements

cannot be

used as evidence against the defendant.

See,

e.g.,

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218. 228 (1973); State v. Kysar, 114 Idaho 457,
459 (Ct. App. 1988). As the United States Supreme Court has explained:

"For, no

matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no more
than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is
directed."

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 (defining the test for voluntariness in the

context of the Fourth Amendment); Kysar, 114 Idaho at 458 (evaluating the same
12

uestion under the auspices of the
may

and Fourteenth Amendments). Furthermore,

that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but

illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in this way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."' Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 228-29 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (overruled
on other grounds, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967))). Thus, "'[i]t is the duty
of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon."' Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635).
The arena of noncustodial police interrogations is one such area where coercion
may be in a less repulsive form, but is nonetheless unconstitutional. After all, there is
no evidence that Mr. Simpson was physically abused in order to extract his statement.

(See generally Exhibit 1a) However, in the words of the United States Supreme Court,
'"coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (quoting

Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)). The Supreme Court explained that,
precisely because the techniques used in the custodial interrogation are inherently
coercive, the courts must be watchful for improper use of those techniques so as to
guard

against the

unconstitutional

extraction

of statements from

subjects of

interrogation Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
The Supreme Court's concerns with police coercion in custodial interrogations
are equally applicable in the noncustodial interview - the tactics being used by the
officers are designed to convince a person to make a statement when he is not
otherwise inclined to do so. (See, e.g. R, pp.116-17 (the district court explaining that
all police interviews involve some level of coercion; Tr., Vol.1, p.140, L.5 - p.141, L.3
13

(Dr. Honts describing such a statement as a coerced-compliant statement).) Therefore,
tactics used by

courts should evaluate the

officers in

noncustodial setting with the same care as the tactics used in the custodial setting so as
to ensure the officers do not impermissibly overbear the subject's will to extract a
statement in violation of his constitutional rights.

See, e.g., State v. Troy, 124 Idaho

211, 214 (1993) ("the proper inquiry is to look at the totality of the circumstances and
then ask whether the defendant's will was overborn.")
One of the common interrogation techniques used by officers is the so-called
"Reid technique," which Dr. Honts described at length in his testimony. 10

( See

Tr., Vol. 1, p.99, LS - p.101, L 15.) The Reid technique is a multistep process which
involves the officers seeking to get statements from the defendant by a variety of
tactics.

First, the interrogators put the subject on the defensive and seek to stress

him out

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.99, Ls.14-16.) This happens, in part, by isolating the subject

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.101, Ls.2-4.) The interrogators also maintain control of the room, often by
placing themselves between the subject and the door. (Tr., Vol.1, p.101, Ls.4-8.)
Then, the officers start developing themes which minimize the alleged conduct or
maximize the seriousness of noncooperation.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.99

p.100, L.5.)

In

developing these themes, officers may use a variety of approaches, such as minimizing
the alleged conduct, making representations about the nature of other evidence in the
case (whether true or fabricated) (see Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.27-24), or using a "false
friend" persona (see State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1016-17 (Utah 1999)
(discussing the use of the false friend tactic)).

Important to this whole process,

Although not discussing them as part of a single technique, the United States
Supreme Court has evaluated the use of the same sort of tactics which make up the
Reid technique at some length in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-55.
10
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however, is that the interrogators start from the standpoint that the defendant is
guilty, and (b) lying, and so, the interrogators will not allow the subject to deny their

accusations. (See Tr., p.100, L.25 - p 101, L.2 ("The person is not allowed to deny.
Everything they deny or attempt to come up with an alternative hypothesis, they' re
interrupted ")
The use of any of these tactics is not per se problematic; rather, one or several of
these tactics may be misapplied in a given interrogation, and, as such, will produce an
unconstitutional coerced-compliant statement. See, e.g. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-55;
Kysar, 114 Idaho at 457; see also Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1017 (specifically
evaluating the use of the Reid technique); In re Elias V., 237 Cal.App.4th 568
(Cal.Ct.App. 2015) (same).

This is important because, when these interrogation

techniques are misapplied, it causes significant problems.

As Dr. Honts testified, in

approximately 25% of the cases where the Innocence Project has shown actual
innocence, there has been a factually-untrue confession by the defendant. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.101, Ls.20-23.) Furthermore, in nearly all the interrogations leading to those coercedcompliant confessions, the interrogators misused the false-evidence tactic. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.101, Ls.20-23.)

Similarly, Dr. Honts testified that laboratory studies have revealed

that, when the interrogator uses (much less misuses) the minimization tactic, "they
increased the risk of false confession by a factor of three." (Tr., Vol.1, p.106, Ls.5-12.)
The Utah Supreme Court has explored the reason behind an innocent person's
decision to make a factually-untrue confession in light of interrogators misusing these
tactics. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015-17. For example, the Utah Court noted that,
when interrogators lie to the subject of the interrogation about the evidence they have,
"it may lead to wrongly accused suspects 'to see themselves as either being set up or
15

railroaded."' Id. at 1015 (quoting Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A Leo, The Decision to
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U
(1

Rev. 979, 1044

"Such suspects may well determine that 'continued resistance is futile

(because the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence) "'

Id. (quoting Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 Rutgers
L. Rev. 2001, 2053 (1998)). Thus, "[s]uch a suspect may also conclude that, given the
futility of resistance, it is most prudent to cooperate and even confess falsely in order to
get leniency."

Id.

This tactic is particularly coercive and troubling when the

interrogators lie about whether they have scientific evidence (such as DNA, fingerprints,
or ballistic evidence) because '"[b]oth the guilty and the innocent have a harder time
explaining away evidence that is allegedly derived from scientific technologies."'

Id.

(quoting Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, at 1023). The Utah Supreme
Court recognized that similar problems arise, and thus, coerced-compliant statements
are extracted, when interrogators misapply other aspects of the Reid technique, such as
the false friend tactic or the minimization tactic. See id. at 1017-18.
Thus, in order to determine whether the interrogators are misusing a particular
tactic or technique, it is important to look at the tactic in the context of the interrogation
as a whole (i.e., evaluate it in the totality of the circumstances). For example, in Kysar,
the defendant had been arrested and asked voluntarily to speak with the lead
investigator.

Kysar, 114 Idaho at 457.

During the ensuing 30-minute interview, the

defendant was emotional, the officer said he would talk to the prosecutor about the
defendant's cooperation, and the officer told the defendant that he expected the
defendant would be released in time to be present for his child's birth. Id. at 457-58.
The Court of Appeals found that the defendant's ensuing statements about the offense
16

were not voluntary because the officer's statements amounted to promises he did not
the authority to fulfill, and so, the officer's statements were unconstitutionally
Id. at 458-59.

By contrast, in State v. Loosli, the officer made various statements during a
voluntary interview with the defendant to the effect that God would not forgive the
defendant if he was not honest, and that the officer would tell the defendant's daughters
that the defendant was calling them liars, which might cause them to consider
committing suicide. State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 400 (1997). Despite the extreme
nature of the officer's comments, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the defendant's
subsequent statements were still voluntary: "although no Miranda Warnings [sic] were
given, Loosli came voluntarily to the police station; the questioning by the officers was of
a 'relatively short length'[ 11 ]; Loosli was a mature adult, whose education level is not
disclosed by the record; the questioning was of a persistent nature but of a short
duration," the totality of the circumstances did not indicate the defendant's will had been
overborn. Id.
This case is more like Kysar than Loosli. For example, unlike the defendant in

Loosli, Mr. Simpson has mental health issues which impact his ability to process
information and appreciate it in its broader context. (Tr., Vol.1, p.85, L.9 - p.92, L.17
(Dr. Lindsey testifying about his professional impressions of Mr. Simpson's cognitive

abilities); 2013 PSE (detailing Dr. Lindsey's opinions about Mr. Simpson's cognitive
abilities); PSI, p.11 (noting that, while Mr. Simpson was able to graduate high school, he
required special education courses to reach that goal).)

For example, Dr. Lindsey

The exact length of the interview is not identified in the Loosli opinion. See generally
Loosli, 130 Idaho 398.
11
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explained that Mr. Simpson struggled to fully appreciate the nature of his statements
the alleged conduct in this case:

"he has some difficulty with social

comprehension and social judgment And that was based on -- on his -- his reversal of
course in the interview with police." (Tr., VoL 1, p.89, Ls.7-10.) These struggles were
the likely related to his executive dysfunction and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
(2013 PSE, p.5.)
Thus, unlike the defendant in Loosli, Mr. Simpson was not "the mature adult of
unknown education leveL" He is an adult who, though capable, struggles to understand
the nature of the interrogation and his statements made therein. That means he was
more likely to be coerced and to have his will overborn by the officers' interrogation
techniques than the defendant in Loosli. Compare Kysar, 114 Idaho 457-59.
However, the district court did not consider Mr. Simpson's mental health issues in
its analysis of this issue because it believed the officers' testimony that Mr. Simpson
appeared to be tracking their questions during the interview. (R., p.116.) That decision
was erroneous because it misconstrued Dr. Lindsey's testimony and his evaluation, and
thus, the nature of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. See Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139
Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (reiterating that, when the district court reaches a factual
conclusion that is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, that conclusion
should be set aside as clearly erroneous).
Dr. Lindsey testified that Mr. Simpson is capable of offering a plausible response
to a question, but that he will still experience "some difficulty with social comprehension
and social judgment."

(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.7-8.)

In fact, Dr. Lindsey testified that

Mr. Simpson's struggles were actually evident during the interrogation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.89,
Ls.8-10.) For example, in regard to Mr. Simpson mentioning the vibrator:
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He justified why he told the story that he did in the end with, you know,
"well, she had" -- "she had a vibrator, and so that made me think, well, I'll
just use that as a story." And there's not -- there isn't the kind of
sophisticated thinking-through of things that I would expect most people to
have .... it's just the -- the simplistic and almost illogical use of some of
the reasons that he reversed course. And the reversal of course was, you
know, blatant
(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.11-24.) Dr. Lindsey concluded this was the result of the fact that
Mr. Simpson "just doesn't process information very quickly, and the thought processes
move slowly compared to the average person." 12 (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.10-12.) Thus, the
district court's conclusion -

because Mr. Simpson appeared to be tracking the

questions, there were no mental health issues at play in the interrogation (R., p.116) - is
a nonsequitur at best.

Mr. Simpson was displaying mental health issues in his

comprehension of, and responses to, the officers' questions regardless of whether he
was "tracking" the questions.

(See Tr., Vol.1, p.89, L11 - p.90, L.12 (Dr. Lindsey

explaining Mr. Simpson's mental health issues).) Thus, his mental health issues were a
factor in the interrogation, and so, needed to be considered in the totality of the
circumstances even if his struggles were not immediately apparent to the officers.

See State v. Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 430 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 165, 167 (1986)) (reaffirming that a person's "'mental condition is surely
relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercions,"' and thus, is a factor that
needs to be considered in the totality of the circumstances).

Therefore, the district

court's refusal to consider that factor in the totality of the circumstances was erroneous.
As such, that decision should at least be vacated.

The prosecutor offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Lindsey's testimony about the
nature and presentation of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. (See generally R., Tr.)
12
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Similarly, the district court refused
informed of his right

consider the factor that Mr. Simpson was
his right to have an attorney present as

remain silent

discussed in Miranda based on its conclusion that Miranda was irrelevant in this case as
it was not a custodial interrogation.

(R., p.116.)

As with its failure to consider

Mr. Simpson's mental health issues, that determination constitutes an improper
perspective on the relevance of that factor. In fact, that conclusion is directly contrary to
Idaho Supreme Court precedent.

See, e.g., State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191

(2000). In Radford, the Idaho Supreme Court explained "we first note it is undisputed
that Radford was not in custody at the time the statements were made. Even if the
interview were non-custodial, Radford's statements are still inadmissible if the
statements were not voluntary."

Id.

It subsequently noted that one of the relevant

factors to the question of whether the statements were voluntary was "[w]hether
Miranda warnings were given."

Id.

Thus, the Court considered the fact that the

defendant had been given Miranda warnings during his voluntary interview as a factor
which tended to show that his statements were voluntary (though that factor was
ultimately outweighed by the other factors in that case). Id.
Similarly, in Loosli, the Court considered the fact that "although no Miranda
Warnings [sic] were given, Loosli came voluntarily to the police station," as a factor

tending to show his statements were involuntary (though, as in Radford, that conclusion
was outweighed in the totality of all the relevant factors). Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400. The
district court's determination to the contrary - that the fact Mr. Simpson was not given a
Miranda warning is irrelevant (R., p.116) - is, thus, clearly error. As such, that decision

should at least be vacated.
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With two of the relevant factors - Mr. Simpson's mental health issues and the
Miranda warnings - already indicating that the interview in this case was more

than others, and the record already indicating that Mr. Simpson was more
susceptible to coercion, the officers began applying several of the tactics in the Reid
interrogation technique to try and get Mr. Simpson to make a statement. 13

(See

Tr., Vol.1, p.106, Ls.17-21 (Dr. Honts testifying that the officers were employing tactics
that are part of the Reid technique).)
For example, the officers were expressly operating on the premise that
Mr. Simpson was guilty:
LEROY SIMPSON. You guys are already saying I did it.
BRENT LAWRENCE: You did do it
(Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:51·10; Exhibit 1b, p.52, Ls.21-23.)

As a result, they did not

accept any of Mr. Simpson's denials or explanations, often retorting, as demonstrated
above, with angry assertions that he was lying. (See generally Exhibits 1a and 1b.)
The officers' statements during the interrogation also show they were engaged in
theme-building.

(See generally Exhibit 1 b.) In fact, as Dr. Honts pointed out, every

incriminating statement Mr. Simpson ultimately made was a repetition or endorsement

It is true that Officer Lawrence testified he had not been specifically trained in the
Reid technique. (Tr., Vol.1, p.19, L.9 - p.20, L.3 (Officer Lawrence testifying that he has
not had any recent formal training in interrogation techniques, just that the subject had
been touched on as part of other classes which he had taken)). However, even if they
were not trained in that particular technique, the use of the tactics which compromise
that technique still introduced the same risk of evoking a coerced-compliant statement
from Mr. Simpson, and thus, should still be reviewed for proper and constitutional
application. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-55 (evaluating the use of these tactics
in regard to a potentially unconstitutional interrogation without indicating whether the
officers in that case had been formally trained in a particular interrogation technique). In
fact, if the officers were not trained in the proper use of these tactics, it is actually more
likely that they would misuse the tactics and violate Mr. Simpson's constitutional rights
during the interrogation.
13
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of one of the themes the officers had already suggested

113,

see generally Exhibit 1b )

particularly Officer Marley, developed

him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.112, L.23

One of the biggest themes the officers,
Mr. Simpson was referencing his traumatic

childhood and suggesting that those experiences influenced his behavior with M.G
(See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.23, L.23 - p.24, L.6; Exhibit 1b, p.40, Ls.16-20; see also
Tr., Vol.1, p.70, L.19 - p.71, L.6 (Officer Marley acknowledging that a lot of her
questions dealt with this particular theme).) The effect of that theme was particularly
pronounced in this case because Officer Marley had been a social worker assigned to
work on the case resulting from those traumatic experiences, and so, had first-hand
knowledge of the facts. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.18, Ls.13-17 (Officer Marley discussing
some details of their previous encounters, including the fact that she had placed
Mr. Simpson in foster care).) 14 As Dr. Honts testified, this tactic "seems very coercive
psychologically, and I was actually very surprised that someone would do that."
(Tr., Vol.1, p.111, L.11 -p.112, L.6.)
Dr. Honts' concerns are particularly related to the issues surrounding the "false
friend" tactic Officer Marley was employing. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.1
("I come to you feeling empathy and sadness for you and hoping that I can help you,

hoping I can help you somehow."); Exhibit 1b, p.57, Ls.5-6 ('Tm a social worker wearing
a police uniform.").) What she was telling Mr. Simpson was essentially, "I was able to
help you before, so I'll be able to help you again."

Her demeanor, posture, and

tone are significantly different when she went to this theme.

(See e.g., Exhibit 1a,

The fact that Officer Marley was correcting Mr. Simpson as to some of the specifics of
that prior encounter (see Exhibit 1b, p.18, L.12 - p.19, L.2) also demonstrates that the
district court's factual conclusion that Officer Marley did not reply on the specifics of
their prior relationship (R., p.117) is clearly erroneous.
14
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1 04:21 - 12:05:20; generally Exhibit 1a.) In the totality of the circumstances, such as
which by itself was already bordering on

Simpson's mental health issues, this

edge of propriety (Tr., Vol.1, p.111. L.11 - p.12, L.6), was impermissibly coercive
and contributed to Mr. Simpson making a coerced-compliant statement. As the Utah
Supreme Court explained·

"The false friend stratagem provides an environment in

which other interrogation tactics may become coercive."

Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at

1017. In fact, it "may be ideally suited to extract an involuntary confession from certain
types of suspects who, like Rettenberger [and Mr. Simpson] have below-average
cognitive abilities," and other mental health issues. Id. at 1016. Those sort of persons
in particular, who are presented with a false friend:
[are] less likely to question the false claims about the evidence against
him; [are] less likely to clearly invoke his right to counsel or to remain
silent; [are] more likely to 'parrot' back the details the officers suggested,
whether or not they were true; [are] more likely to place stock in any
promises or threats the officers made, however ambiguous they might be;
and [are] more likely to confess, whether guilty or innocent.
Id. at 1017.

Thus, the particularly egregious use of the false friend tactic against

Mr. Simpson, particularly given his mental health issues, demonstrates that his
statements

were

coerced-compliant

statements

extracted

in

violation

of

his

constitutional rights.
As the Rettenberger Court noted, one of the tactics more likely to be problematic
in light of the false friend tactic is the false claims about other evidence indicating the
subject's guilt. Id. Officer Marley, while using the false friend tactic, also employed the
false evidence tactic, implying that officers had evidence, including scientific evidence,
which proved Mr. Simpson's guilt. 15

(See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.31, Ls.3-18; but see

As Dr. Honts testified, interrogators tend to imply connections and consequences
rather than articulating them outright. (Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.6-16.) Thus, by telling

15
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, Vol.1, p.73, L.17 - p.74, L.7 (admitting those implications were false); Tr., Vol.1,
waiting for results from the tests on

(admitting officers were

evidence).) Officer Lawrence also used the false evidence tactic, asserting
that they had a series of experts with solid reputations who would testify that
Mr. Simpson was guilty. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.49, L.24 - p.50, L.7.) However, that
too, was a lie. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.32, L.5 - p.33, L.7.)
The coercive effect of these misrepresentations of the evidence is demonstrated
by Mr. Simpson's responses thereto.

He did not give explanations for that supposed

evidence, but simply said, "I don't see why everyone is trying to say I did it though,"
(Exhibit 1b, p.35, Ls.16-17), or "You're saying it points back to me. (Inaudible) I didn't
touch that kid, that kid at all, so--." (Exhibit 1b, p.42, Ls.18-20). As the Utah Supreme
Court has explained, such responses are characteristic of a coerced-compliant
statement because it shows that the subject of the interrogation is feeling railroaded,
that he has no explanation for the supposed scientific evidence, and so, has concluded
continuing to profess their innocence is futile. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015-17.
The other major theme the officers used was a theme of minimization, which
included several subthemes.

For example, they expressed to Mr. Simpson, who

already struggles to see information in its proper broader context, that his alleged
actions were understandable because he was just stressed out or frustrated. (See, e.g.,
Exhibit 1b, p.24, Ls.7-13.) They also worked the idea that it is hard to talk about the

Mr. Simpson they had the ability to gather semen, DNA, and other bodily fluids, and
following that with the assertion that they had collected all of the evidence they needed,
Officer Marley implied that they had collected that sort of scientific evidence.
(See Exhibit 1b, p.31, Ls.4-18.)
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alleged actions because they were not consistent with Mr. Simpson's overall personality
character. (See e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.32, Ls.1
They contrasted that theme of minimization by telling him his denials and
explanations were lies, and that he was telling conflicting stories. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b,
p.25, Ls.7-12; Exhibit 1b, p.29, Ls.14-15.)

They reinforced that theme by asking him,

"how do you live with yourself[?]" (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.17-18; p.39, Ls.11-13;
p.43, Ls.2-3.) While appeals to moral sensibility may generally be a permissible tactic

(see, e.g., Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400), it, like all the other interrogation tactics, can be
misused. See Rettenberger, 948 P.2d at 1017. The development of the minimization
theme in this case is an example of such a misapplication of the interrogation tactics,
particularly given the way Officer Lawrence used that tactic.
Officer Lawrence developed two particular subthemes within the overall themes
of minimizing and maximizing when he took over the interrogation. First, he worked on
the idea that "part of being sorry is saying it was an accident." (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b,
p.46, L 10.) Second, he harped on the point that "[n]obody is going to believe you."

(See} e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.47, L.19; see, e.g .. Exhibit 1a, 12.38:40-12:45:45 (depicting the
shifts in tone and demeanor as Officer Lawrence developed these two themes).) He
also worked in all the other established themes to bring the interrogation to its apex:
So when mistakes happen, we need to acknowledge it and then say to the
person a bad thing happened, I'm sorry, it will never happen again. And
then when you that, it actually means something as opposed to, no, I don't
want to own that because I don't like what happened. Well not owning it
doesn't mean it didn't happen. Not owning it means that you're just not
the person that everybody wants you to be, that you should be, that I think
you are, as a caring person. Because everybody is going to look at this
and go, you know man, that's really horrible, what happened to this kid. I
can't believe he's not even man enough to say I'm sorry.
(Exhibit 1b, p.48, Ls.5-18.)
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It is at this point where the coercion though evident throughout the interrogation,
is

clearly visible, as Officer Lawrence gave Mr. Simpson an ultimatum.
So what I'm saying to you, Le[r]oy, which person are you, this person over
here that nobody can respect that goes, okay, a bad thing happened, but I
don't like it, so it didn't happen, or this person over here that says, yeah,
I'm sorry, I was under a lot of stress. You know, life gets away from me. It
was a mistake. You know, I'm really, really, really sorry and I'll do my best
to make sure that it's as good as it can be. I'll help. So at the end of the
day, which is right now, Le[r]oy, which one are you?

(Exhibit 1b, p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.9.) There is only one answer to that question unless
Mr. Simpson wanted to admit to being an uncaring, unrespected person. Additionally,
Officer Marley just spent a lot of her time building up the idea that Mr. Simpson is a
good person whose alleged bad act was justifiable, merely a product of his traumatic
childhood, and not indicative of who he actually is. (See generally Exhibit 1b, pp.17-43.)
Then, when Mr. Simpson gave the answer Officer Marley had primed him to give,
which was really the only answer he could give, Officer Lawrence told him "you're

words are empty unless you take responsibility."
(emphasis added).

(Exhibit 1b, p.49, Ls.12-13

Officer Lawrence's tone was particularly authoritative, practically

yelling, as he repeated his demand for Mr. Simpson to give that answer. (See, e.g.,
Exhibit 1a, approx.

12:51:10 (when Mr. Simpson repeats that he did not do anything

wrong, Officer Lawrence forcefully asserts, "You did do it. I'm giving you the opportunity
to explain it," while pointing his finger at Mr. Simpson); Exhibit 1b, 52, 23-24 (transcript
of that exchange).) With the ultimatum and demand to prove it, Officer Lawrence put
Mr. Simpson in a worse situation than the one identified by the Utah Supreme Court
found in Rettenberger, where the factors surrounding that less coercive situation
"compel[] a determination that Rettenberger's confession was involuntary to the extent
that the record indicates that his will, already vulnerable due to certain known mental
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disabilities and deficiencies, was overborne by the suggestive and coercive techniques
the investigators, which exploited those very vulnerabilities." Rettenberger, 984
at 1021.
Officer Lawrence was demanding Mr. Simpson admit the alleged conduct, or
else, forfeit the right to care about M.G. and the right to expect understanding from (and
so, potentially, reacceptance by) the community.

That told Mr. Simpson, with his

concrete and under-appreciative thought processes, that resistance and continued
expressions of his innocence would be futile, and he might as well tell the officers what
they wanted to hear, under the hope that he might get some leniency. See id.; see also

Kysar, 114 Idaho 457-459 (explaining how, while an interrogator's statements might
seem benign, they could still be presented in such a way as to overbear the subject's
will and unconstitutionally produce a statement by the defendant, even in a thirty-minute
interview that the defendant himself requested).

It is unsurprising, then, that once

Officer Lawrence gave Mr. Simpson this ultimatum and forcefully demanded he prove
his answer (see generally Exhibit 1a, approximately 12:51:10-12:55:00; Exhibit 1b,
pp.48-53), Mr. Simpson started making the incriminating statements

(See generally

Exhibit 1b, pp.53-58 (indicating he was sorry for the actions for which he had been
accused and explaining that he had been in the midst of a severe depressive episode at
the time)).
The only deviation from the officers' apparently-intended progression of the
interrogation (that they would break Mr. Simpson and he would start telling them
everything they wanted him to) was the fact that Mr. Simpson asked to be able to take a
smoke break. (Exhibit 1 b, p.58, Ls.22-24.) While allowing the subject to take breaks
may, in a vacuum, be a factor which indicates a less-coercive atmosphere, it is the
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context of the factor that makes all the difference under the Constitution.

See, e.g.,

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27; Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015; compare Kysar, 114
Idaho at 458-59 (involving less extreme statements unconstitutionally overbearing the
subject's will); with Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400 (more extreme statements which did not
overbear the subject's will).

The context in this case demonstrates the fact that the

officers allowed Mr. Simpson to take a smoke break did not make his subsequent
statements voluntary because they had already broken his will with Officer Lawrence's
ultimatum and demand to prove it; he simply asked to have a "cigarette first," before
making statements. (Exhibit 1b, p.58, L.22 )
Furthermore, there are specific facts about the smoke break itself which indicate
it was not as noncoercive as it might first appear.

For example, Mr. Simpson was

chaperoned by Officer Marley throughout the smoke break; she "didn't consider" letting
Mr. Simpson go alone.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.70 Ls.16-18.) As the United States Supreme

Court pointed out in Miranda, that is inherently coercive, as the officers are trained that
'"[t]he subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage.
investigator possesses all the advantages."'

. In his office, the

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50 (quoting

Charles E. O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation, p.99 (1956)).

Allowing

Mr. Simpson to designate a break would give him a psychological advantage of
appearing to have some control over the interrogation. Thus, Officer Marley countered
that advantage by chaperoning him during the smoke break.

By so doing, she

maintained the atmosphere of the officers' complete control, which makes the situation
more coercive. See id.
This desire to maintain total control over the interrogation is particularly evident
given Officer Marley's testimony that, when Officer Lawrence got frustrated and yelled
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Mr. Simpson, and Mr. Simpson stood up, she also stood up, so as to retain control
over the room. ( See

, Vol. 1, p.46, L.17 - p.4 7,

However, the officers had never

really lost control of the room. From the outset, they dictated where Mr. Simpson could
sit, telling him to move from the chair next to the door to the chair across the room from
the door. (Exhibit 1a, approx .. 11 :47:45.) Thus, when the officers subsequently entered
the room and sat in the chair by the door, they controlled the room.

(See generally

Exhibit 1a.) In fact, Officer Marley had to shift so that Officer Lawrence could get into
the room.

(Exhibit 1a, approximately 12:38:40.) And when both officers were in the

room, Officer Lawrence was either standing in front of the door or in the door jam.
(See generally Exhibit 1a.) As such, the officers were always in control of the room, and
Mr. Simpson could not have left the room without their allowing him to do so.

As a

result, Mr. Simpson was isolated in that room until the officers decided to let him go,
regardless of what representations they made that he would be free to leave of his own
volition.
Additionally, the record reveals that Officer Marley continued to talk with
Mr. Simpson about subjects associated with the interrogation during the smoke break.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.6.) For example, Officer Marley testified that, during the
smoke break, Mr. Simpson asked if he would be going to jail that day, and she
responded that he would not.

(Tr., Vol 1, p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.6.)

The assertion

that Mr. Simpson would not be arrested that day also shows coercion in the context of
the interrogation because it indicated to Mr. Simpson that he could make the
statements they wanted with some level of impunity. That was particularly coercive in
Mr. Simpson's case, when his executive dysfunction, which limits his ability to put
information into its broader context, is factored in
29

The coercive effect of that statement

is also particularly obvious in this case, since Mr. Simpson had not been given a
Miranda warning, which would tell

would

repercussions

making a

statement (i.e. that anything he said can and would be used against him in a court of
law).
It is also problematic that the smoke break was not recorded.

particularly problematic in this case,

In fact, it is

as Officer Marley had already assured

Mr. Simpson, as part of her earlier comments, that ''[w]henever I talk to somebody, I
record what we say." (Exhibit 1b, p.23, Ls.9-10.) Thus, Mr. Simpson would reasonably
have been under the impression that the smoke break would also be recorded, since
Officer Marley was talking with him, and whenever that happens, she "record[s] what we
say.

The United States Supreme Court has indicated it is important to have recordings

of such interactions to avoid "a gap in our knowledge" in assessing whether the officers
unconstitutionally extracted a statement from a person. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.

In

those cases, according to the United States Supreme Court, the courts can only look at
what the officers are taught to do in such situations as an indication of what was likely
happening during the unrecorded parts of the interrogation. Id. at 448-50 (reviewing
texts discussing interrogation techniques and the coercive approaches officers are
taught).

Since, as noted above, officers are taught to maintain every psychological

advantage, the known factors suggest that Officer Marley continued to keep that
pressure on Mr. Simpson, implicitly or explicitly, as she chaperoned his smoke break.
In fact, the record actually suggests that Officer Marley did precisely that, and
kept the pressure (impliedly or expressly) on Mr. Simpson during the smoke break. As
Officer Marley testified, Mr. Simpson's demeanor changed when they came back in
from the smoke break.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.49, Ls.7-16; see Exhibit 1a, 12:58:15-1:00:02.)
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Dr. Honts also made specific note of this "sudden change" in Mr. Simpson's demeanor,
describing it as "interesting.

(Tr., Vol:1,

115, Ls.18-24.) Dr. Lindsey also noted the

unusual nature of the change in Mr. Simpson's behavior, describing it as "blatant," and
his ensuing statements as "simplistic and almost illogical." (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.21-24.)
This all indicates that Mr. Simpson's will was broken at least by the time he and Officer
Marley came back in from the smoke break; that he had decided by that point that
resisting was pointless and that cooperating (whether his subsequent statements were
factually true or not) was his only choice. Compare Rettenberger, 984 P .2d at 1015.
Thus, in the context of the whole interrogation. Officer Marley's decision to
chaperone Mr. Simpson's smoke break was only reinforcing the coercive nature of the
situation As such, the fact that a smoke break occurred does not mean the statements
Mr. Simpson subsequently gave were not coerced-compliant statements.
Finally, the nature of Mr. Simpson's admissions demonstrate that he was making
coerced-compliant statements. For example, after breaking Mr. Simpson's will in regard
to M.G.'s physical injuries, Officer Marley took time to focus on the injuries on M.G.'s
anus. (See Exhibit 1b, p.63, Ls.12-14.) She reinforced some of the themes again, and
before long, Mr. Simpson began making more incriminating statements.
p.66, Ls.23-25.)

(Exhibit 1b,

However, when Officer Marley pushed further, suggesting that

Mr. Simpson had used his penis to penetrate M.G.'s anus, she hit a truth she could not
break - Mr. Simpson had not engaged in that conduct. 16 (See also Tr., Vol.1, p.63,
Ls.9-21 (Officer Marley admitting that Mr. Simpson never adopted her suggestion that
he had put his penis in M.G.'s mouth either).) Thus, he maintained his innocence on

As Officer Lawrence testified, the goal of interrogating people is to "get information"
from the subject regardless of whether that information is incriminating to the subject.
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.17-p.22, L.25.)
16
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that point despite having given coerced-compliant statements in regard to the other
allegations.
In that regard, it is important to remember that the veracity of the coercedcompliant statement is irrelevant to the question of whether there has been a
constitutional violation - a person's constitutional rights are violated if the officers
overbear the defendant's will, such that his decision to make a statement that was not
voluntary. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27. As Dr. Honts explained, both
the factually-innocent and the factually-guilty person can be coerced to give involuntary
statements; the only difference is whether the coerced-compliant statement is, itself,
factually true. (Tr., Vol.1, p.140, Ls.5-15.) Thus, the fact that Mr. Simpson maintained
his innocence as to using his penis on M.G. does not demonstrate that the officers had
not already unconstitutionally extracted coerced-compliant statements from him.

As

discussed supra, that's precisely what they did.
Furthermore, the context of Mr. Simpson's statements about the penetration of
M G 's anus also indicate that he was still making a coerced-complaint statements. As
Dr. Lindsey explained (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls 11-24), Mr. Simpson was grasping at straws,
and so, gave a "simplistic and almost illogical" explanation for the evidence with which
Officer Marley was confronting him.

Compare Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015

(explaining that both the factually-innocent and factually-guilty face difficulty in offering
alternative explanations for forensic evidence the officers may or may not actually
have). And, as Dr. Honts pointed out, Mr. Simpson did not suggest that he had used
the vibrator to penetrate M.G.'s anus until Officer Marley had suggested it. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.112, L.23 - p.113, L.4.) The record bears out Dr. Honts' testimony:
JESSICA MARLEY: You didn't put your penis inside?
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LEROY SIMPSON. (Inaudible)
Kind of an indication that the doctor

JESSICA MARLEY: Did you start
said.

LEROY SIMPSON: It could have been -- Tracy has a vibrator.[ 17] I know
that so -JESSICA MARLEY: Did you use the vibrator? It's okay, Le[r]oy, if you
did.
LEROY SIMPSON: No, I didn't.
JESSICA MARLEY: Hold on.
LEROY SIMPSON: Like I said, Tracy's got a vibrator, so I -- I got two, but
I (inaudible) -JESSICA MARLEY: The indication is that he had some damage, and
where there's damage anally, it's bigger than a finger. So you know it
could have been your penis. It could have been a vibrator.
LEROY SIMPSON: I know I didn't put my penis in him.
JESSICA SIMPSON: So was it your vibrator or Tracy's you used?
LEROY SIMPSON· (Inaudible).
JESSICA SIMPSON: Okay. Which vibrator? What does that look like.
LEROY SIMPSON. Tracy (inaudible) it's at her house.
LEROY SIMPSON: I used Tracy's [vibrator] and put it in [M.G.] one night.
(Exhibit 1b, p.67, L.14

p.68, L.14 (emphasis added); Exhibit 1b, p.71, Ls.18-19.)

When Mr. Simpson was unable to give as detailed an account as Officer Marley
apparently would have liked in regard to the vibrator, she made another statement

It is important to remember that Mr. Simpson is not suspected of causing all of M.G.'s
injuries. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.37, Ls.3-7 (the prosecutor admitting that Mr. Simpson
was probably not the source of all M.G.'s injuries).) Consistent with that fact,
Mr. Simpson tried, at various points in the interrogation, tried to talk about what M.G.'s
parents had done to M.G., but the officers would either cut off or redirect the
interrogation when Mr. Simpson did this. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.33, Ls.4-21; Exhibit
1 b, p.34, Ls.4-16.)
17
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which, like Officer Lawrence's ultimatum, particularly highlights the coercion that was
applied during the interrogation of Mr. Simpson: Officer Marley told Mr. Simpson:
"I

trying to figure out and make sure

there are no other children. . .

that's the case, you need a different kind of help."

Because if

(Exhibit 1 b, p.71, Ls.2-6; see

generally Exhibit 1 b, p.71, Ls.2-16 (continuing to develop this theme).)

There is no

"right" answer to Officer Marley's question. The subject cannot say that there are no
kids because that will not answer the question (whether there are other children). The
call of the question requires the subject to admit harming at least one child. Thus, the
only real choice the subject has is, like Mr, Simpson ultimately did (Exhibit 1b, p.71,
Ls.17-20), to say there are no other children.

Otherwise, he would be admitting to

abusing a number of other children unrelated to this investigation. 18

The no-win

scenario presented by Officer Marley's question demonstrates that ML Simpson
immediately-subsequent statement - where he fully, and for the first time, admitted,
"I used Tracy's [vibrator] and put it in [M.G.] one night" (Exhibit 1, p. 71, Ls.18-19; see

generally Exhibit 1b, pp.67-71 (emphasis added)) - was also a coerced-compliant
statement obtained by Officer Marley in violation of his constitutional rights.
Because all of Mr. Simpson's incriminating statements during this interrogation
were made after the officers impermissibly overbore his will, and so, were coerced-

There was no evidence in the investigation suggesting that there might be other kids.
(See generally R., Tr.) Thus, unless Officer Marley was being deliberately untruthful
(which, as Dr. Honts testified (Tr., Vol.1, p.101, Ls.20-23), raises a whole different set of
issues, see also Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015), her use of this tactic was to evaluate
Mr. Simpson's credibility on unrelated issues. This actually runs afoul of the Reid
technique's instructions, which emphasize that '"[i]nterrogations should not be used as a
primary means to evaluate the suspect's truthfulness; in most cases, that can be
accomplished during a nonaccusatory interview."' In re Elias, 237 Cal.App.4th at 580
(quoting lnbau & Reid, Criminal Confessions and Interrogation, pp.5-6 (5 th ed. 2013)).
Either way, Officer Marley's use of this tactic was improper and resulted in a coercedcompliant statement. Compare Kysar, 114 Idaho at 458-59.
18
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compliant statements, they should have been suppressed. See, e.g., Kysar, 114 Idaho
459.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Simpson respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015.

&·d~

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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